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Since the seminal work of Franco Modigliani and Merton Miller in 1958, no generally
accepted capital structure theory has emerged. Consequently this paper does not aim to
validate any of the capital structure theories. In fact, in our paper we focus on ‘￿nancial
￿exibility’ as an important determining factor for the capital structure of ￿rms according
to surveys among CFOs (see e.g. Su￿ (2009) and Lins, Servaes, and Tufano (2010)).
Gamba and Triantis (2008) directly address this concept and provide the following de￿-
nition: ￿Financial ￿exibility represents the ability of a ￿rm to access and restructure its
￿nancing at a low cost. Financially ￿exible ￿rms are able to avoid ￿nancial distress in
the face of negative shocks, and to readily fund investment when pro￿table opportunities
arise.￿
We hypothesize that ￿nancial ￿exibility ￿ as the interactions of leverage, cash & cash
equivalents and lines of credit ￿ is a broader, but more consistent, concept in explain-
ing the dynamics of ￿nancing activities than traditional capital structure theory. In our
study, leverage ￿ the pivotal point of every capital structure study ￿ is investigated by
two spotlights. Spotlight A is de￿ned as ￿nancial ￿exibility, in the sense of anticipating
liquidity management. In this context, we analyze the deviation of the most important
balance sheet items induced by changes of leverage, cash & cash equivalents and lines of
credit. This approach, albeit new in its broad extent, is the classical model organization of
capital structure studies. The innovative spotlight B distinguishes between real stochas-
tic and mainly mechanical relationships of the ratio ‘leverage’ and its fractionalized debt
and equity component. This approach takes into account that the leverage ratio of an
average ￿rm reverts to mean mechanically. Without knowledge of this characteristic, the
economic interpretation of the results could be misleading (Chen and Zhao (2007)).
Our results are based on observing US Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs) and
Real Estate Operating Companies (REOCs) from 1995 to 2010. By focusing on real estate
data, we avoid a dilution of di￿erent industry sector e￿ects. The results of perspective A
emphasize the substitutive relationship between leverage and credit lines, backed by the
existing literature. This clari￿es the importance of credit lines for ￿rms’ liquidity man-
agement. The positive in￿uence of leverage on cash & cash equivalents is new evidence
and contrary to previous research. This e￿ect ￿ which appears especially in downturns
￿ can be explained by the ￿rms’ strategy to accumulate cash to fund investment when
pro￿table opportunities arise. The results of perspective B con￿rm our hypothesized ef-
fect that leverage as a ratio would neglect the speci￿c in￿uence on its components and
cause misleading interpretation of the e￿ects. At this point, we would like to point out
the in￿uence of operating cash ￿ow. In economic upturns, a cash ￿ow increase impacts
more investments, ￿nanced by equity, but leverage remains unchanged. In downturns,
investment expenses are funded by debt corresponding with a leverage increase. Besides
these highlighted results, our paper presents the in￿uence of eight traditional and new
capital structure variables in 22 di￿erent subsamples for perspective A as well as for B.Das Wichtigste in K￿rze
Seit der grundlegenden Arbeit zum Gebiet der Kapitalstruktur von Franco Modigliani
und Merton Miller aus dem Jahr 1958 konnte sich bis dato keine Kapitalstrukturthe-
orie als allgemeing￿ltig durchsetzen. Daher beabsichtigt dieser Artikel auch nicht eine
der Theorien zu bewerten, sondern konzentriert sich auf ein relativ neues Konzept als
einen der wichtigsten Treiber f￿r das Kalk￿l von Finanzierungsentscheidungen, die ‘￿-
nanzielle Flexibilit￿t’. Deren Bedeutung wurde bereits in mehreren wissenschaftlichen
Umfragen unter Finanzvorst￿nden hervorgehoben (siehe z.B. Su￿ (2009) und Lins et al.
(2010)). Gamba und Triantis (2008), die ebenfalls in ihrem wissenschaftlichen Artikel das
Konzept aufgreifen, geben dabei folgende De￿nition: ￿Finanzielle Flexibilit￿t repr￿sen-
tiert die F￿higkeit einer Unternehmung, auf Finanzierungsaktivit￿ten zu geringen Kosten
zuzugreifen und diese neu zu strukturieren. Finanziell ￿exible Firmen sind dabei in der
Lage, ￿nanzielle Engp￿sse in Zeiten negativer Marktbedingungen zu vermeiden und In-
vestitionen zu t￿tigen, sobald sich gewinnbringende M￿glichkeiten ergeben.￿
Wir stellen die Hypothese auf, dass die ‘￿nanzielle Flexibilit￿t’, also das Zusammen-
spiel von Verschuldungsgrad, kurzfristig verf￿gbarem Kapital und zugesagten Kredit-
linien, ein breiteres aber dennoch einheitlicheres Konzept im Vergleich zu traditionellen
Kapitalstrukturtheorien darstellt, um die Wechselbeziehungen von Finanzierungsaktiv-
it￿ten und Bilanzposten zu erkl￿ren. In unserer Untersuchung wird der Verschuldungs-
grad ￿ das Hauptaugenmerk jeder Kapitalstrukturstudie ￿ aus zwei Perspektiven beleuchtet.
Perspektive A erfasst die ￿nanzielle Flexibilit￿t im Sinne des Liquidit￿tsmanagements.
Wir analysieren in diesem Zusammenhang die Abweichungen der wichtigsten Bilanz-
posten, die sich durch ˜nderungen bei Verschuldungsgrad, kurzfristig verf￿gbarem Kap-
ital und zugesagten Kreditlinien, ergeben. Dieser Ansatz, auch wenn in seinem Um-
fang neu, entspricht der klassischen Herangehensweise bei Untersuchungen von Kapi-
talstrukturfragen. Die innovative Perspektive B unterscheidet zwischen der mechanis-
chen Beziehung des Quotienten ’Verschuldungsgrad’ und den ˜nderungen seiner einzelnen
Komponenten ‘Eigen- und Fremdkapital’. Hierbei wird der Tatsache Rechnung getragen,
dass der Verschuldungsgrad aufgrund seiner Konstruktion rein mechanisch zum Mittelw-
ert zur￿ckkehrt und eine Vernachl￿ssigung dieser Eigenschaft zu einer Fehlinterpretation
der Ergebnisse f￿hren w￿rde (Chen und Zhao, 2007).
Unsere Ergebnisse basieren auf den Daten von US-amerikanischen Real Estate Invest-
ment Trusts (REITs) und Real Estate Operating Companies (REOCs) im zur Verf￿gung
stehenden Zeitraum von 1995 bis 2010. Die Beschr￿nkung auf diesen reinen Immobilien-
datensatz erm￿glicht es, sich auf branchentypische Ein￿￿sse zu fokusieren. Die Ergebnisse
f￿r Perspektive A verdeutlichen nochmals den aus der aktuellen Literatur bekannten sub-
stitutiven E￿ekt zwischen Verschuldungsgrad und Kreditlinien. Dieses Resultat unter-
streicht die ￿konomische Bedeutung der Kreditlinie als Liquidit￿tsmanagementinstrument
f￿r die Unternehmen. Bemerkenswert und neu ist das Ergebnis, dass Erh￿hungen des
Verschuldungsgrads auch zur marginalen Erh￿hung des kurzfristig verf￿gbaren Kapitals
f￿hren. Ein E￿ekt, der vor allem vor der Finanzkrise zu beobachten war und als strate-
gische Akkumulation von Kapital f￿r zuk￿nftige Projekte zu verstehen ist. Die Ergeb-
nisse f￿r Perspektive B best￿tigen die vermutete Annahme, dass der Verschuldungsgrad
Informationen verschluckt und eine reine Betrachtung der Gr￿￿e ‘Verschuldungsgrad’ zu
Fehlinterpretationen f￿hren w￿rde. Hervorzuheben ist hierbei der Ein￿uss des operativenCash￿ows auf die Bilanzstruktur. In Zeiten wirtschaftlichen Aufschwungs f￿hrt eine Er-
h￿hung des Cash￿ows zu Investitionsausgaben, die durch Eigenkapital ￿nanziert werden,
und zu keinem signi￿kanten Ein￿uss auf den Verschuldungsgrad. Dahingegen werden
im Abschwung Investitionsausgaben v. a. durch eine Fremdkapitalerh￿hung ￿nanziert,
die den Verschuldungsgrad steigen lassen. Neben diesen Ergebnissen liefert die Studie
sowohl f￿r Perspektive A als auch B den Ein￿uss von acht verschiedenen traditionellen
und neueren Kapitalstrukturein￿ussgr￿￿en in 22 verschiedenen Subsamples.The Rat Race of Capital Structure Research
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Abstract
This paper presents a dynamic multi-equation model based on a balance sheet
identity, where technical aspects of capital structure are highlighted through sepa-
rately observing debt and equity and their relationship to investment. Additionally,
leverage dynamics are interpreted in their role for liquidity management. Interac-
tions of leverage with lines of credit (LOC) and cash are considered in the light
of ￿nancial ￿exibility. The major ￿ndings obtained by observing US REITs and
REOCs from 1995 to 2010 are as follows. In accordance with the existing literature,
cash and LOC reveal a substitute relationship. However, the calculus of ￿nancial
￿exibility and our ￿ndings suggest that leverage positively drives cash, which is
consistent with Gamba and Triantis (2008), and also with the accepted perspective
of debt minus cash being net debt (Spotlight A). Consequently, the very robust re-
sults indicate that leverage eliminates a signi￿cant amount of information. Further
mechanical relationships, especially for market leverage, are suggested (Spotlight B).
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The persistently large number of capital structure studies since the seminal work of
Modigliani and Miller (1958) does not yield consistent evidence for one speci￿c capital
structure theory. This study does not aim to validate any of these theories, but follows
Graham and Harvey (2001), who state that ￿￿nancial ￿exibility is the single most im-
portant determinant of capital structure according to CFOs￿. Investigating ￿rm cash
holdings, Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz, and Williamson (1999) argues: ￿Firms want to avoid
situations where the agency costs of debt are so high that they cannot raise funds to
￿nance their activities and invest in valuable projects. Obviously, one way to do so is to
choose a low level of leverage.￿ A more recent example of this stream of research is the
proposal of DeAngelo and DeAngelo (2007), aimed at ￿lling the gap in capital structure
theory and the associated empirical ￿ndings. They state: ￿Financial Flexibility is the
critical missing link for an empirically viable [capital structure] theory.￿ Gamba and Tri-
antis (2008) directly address this concept and provide the following de￿nition: ￿Financial
￿exibility represents the ability of a ￿rm to access and restructure its ￿nancing at a low
cost. Financially ￿exible ￿rms are able to avoid ￿nancial distress in the face of negative
shocks, and to readily fund investment when pro￿table opportunities arise.￿
In the present study, approximation leverage (LEV) is investigated by two spotlights.
Financial ￿exibility, in the sense of anticipating liquidity management, is addressed by
Spotlight A. Interactions of LEV with cash & cash equivalents (CCE) and lines of credit
(LOC) form the focus. The more technical one (Spotlight B) is motivated by the argu-
ments of Chen and Zhao (2007) and Gatchev, Pulvino, and Tarhan (2010). Spotlight
B ensures robust results, distinguishing between real stochastic and mainly mechanical
relationships.
The recent late-2000s ￿nancial crisis in particular, provides the motivation for in-
vestigating Spotlight A. There is consensus in the existing literature on a substitute
relationship between CCE and LOC. This is due to the fact that LOC hedge against
2underinvestment, and CCE against cash ￿ow (CF) shortfalls (Lins, Servaes, and Tufano
(2010)). However, what was evident immediately after the peak of the crisis is that
￿rms draw their available LOC, fearing that they will be canceled due to covenant breaks
(Campello, Graham, and Harvey (2010)). Su￿ (2009) also supports the view that CCE
and LOC are only conditional substitutes. Therefore, this study aims to ￿ll the gap in
the literature, by including LEV in the interactions of sources of liquidity management.
Furthermore, another issue of the late-2000s ￿nancial crisis is the perceived increased
relevance of the real estate industry. Many studies argue that there is homogeneity in
the REIT industry due to legislation, e.g. aspects such as the role of taxes or retained
cash ￿ows are of lower relevance. Hence, more consistent ￿ndings are expected when
concentrating on REITs. Another interesting circumstance within this industry is the
underutilization of CCE, as opposed to a similar level of importance of LOC, compared
to companies outside the real estate industry. This may be due to the fact that the high
dividend payout restriction prevents REITs from accumulating cash. Yet, recent research
by Harrison, Panasian, and Seiler (2011) reports that REITs voluntarily choose to pay
’excess dividends’ ￿ up to 38% of their total assets.
This paper is organized traditionally. Section 2 provides an overview of the related
literature. In section 3, the data are described. Section 4 introduces our model. In section
5, we present the results and section 6 concludes.
2 Literature Review
2.1 General Motivation
At ￿rst, both the general ￿nance literature, as well as real estate studies, seem to reach no
empirically robust consensus on classical capital structure theories. One could cautiously
claim that recent research in this ￿eld agrees on a mixture of trade-o￿ and market-timing
theory as valid. This is justi￿ed mainly by market timing allowing equity issuances to
3be preferable in some states of the economy. 1 Furthermore, LEV often reveals a mean-
reversion characteristic; hence, target-leverage is interpreted as a validation of the trade-
o￿ theory (Flannery and Rangan (2006)).
Hence, the second argument is motivated by Chen and Zhao (2007), who demonstrate,
using the sample of Flannery and Rangan (2006), how their ￿ndings can be justi￿ed by a
purely mechanical characteristic. This is due to the fact that leverage is ’just’ a ratio and
has insu￿cient implications for capital structure dynamics, thus making it an inadequate
tool for distinguishing between di￿erent ￿nancing policies.
The third argument is based on the relevance of taxes to ￿nancing decisions, if one
argues in favor of the trade-o￿ theory. Blouin, Core, and Guay (2010) investigate the
widespread belief in the underutilization of debt. This is supported indirectly by DeAn-
gelo and DeAngelo (2007). They do not exclude a tax-shield, but emphasize that pre-
serving debt capacity, in order to forego investment distortions in the near future, out-
weighs the ￿few cents on the dollar￿ bene￿t of debt. Finally, the present study observes
mainly REITs, which are pass-through entities with respect to the main business activi-
ties. Hence, a tax-shield is assumed to be of no relevance for this paper.
DeAngelo and DeAngelo (2007) recognize the dilemma of capital structure research
and formulate a draft aimed at ￿lling the gap between the traditional theories and em-
pirical ￿ndings. They argue that it is the ’equity as the last resort’ attribute of the
pecking-order theory, and the ’non-occurrence of levering up after stock price increases’
of market-timing, and the ’high dividend-low leverage’ characteristic of pro￿table ￿rms of
trade-o￿ theory which necessitate innovations in this ￿eld of research. Their alternative
approach to explaining capital structure is based on interpreting management actions
in the light of ￿nancial ￿exibility, e.g. preserving debt capacity for facilitating potential
future ￿nancial needs.
1For this reason, pecking-order is often rejected, but seems to be valid for large ￿rms with low market-
to-book-ratio but high cash-￿ows (Leary and Roberts (2010)).
4The above mentioned arguments motivate focusing on leverage with two spotlights:
from the one perspective, leverage is ’just’ a ratio, which absorbs valuable information
by de￿nition. From the other perspective, as a ratio, leverage is one source of liquidity
management; hence, it competes with other sources of ￿nancial ￿exibility. The ￿rst
spotlight can be seen as the more technical one, while the second may be interpreted
rather as an alternative approach to solving the capital structure puzzle. 2 The following
section brie￿y summarizes recent research relevant to these two spotlights.
2.2 Spotlight A: Leverage, Cash & Cash Equivalents and Lines
of Credit
There is a wide range of literature on CCE versus LOC, generally agreeing that these
sources may be assumed to constitute substitutes. 3 Lins, Servaes, and Tufano (2010) ac-
cord di￿erent purposes to CCE and LOC, with respect to the state of the economy. They
argue that LOC serve to ￿nance value-raising projects when they arise, while CCE hedge
against CF shortfalls. Su￿ (2009) investigates the dependence of ￿rm characteristics on
the use of one or the other source. High CF-generating ￿rms maintain LOC, because
of the strong link between ￿nancial covenants and credit facilities. Su￿ also argues that
the unavailability of LOC is a superior proxy for being ￿nancially constrained (for ￿rms
with a high degree of information asymmetry see also An, Hardin, and Wu (2010)). Ac-
cordingly, a positive CF-CCE sensitivity would only prevail for constrained ￿rms, which
do not have a LOC. Interpreting LOC as the nominal amount of debt capacity (see also
Riddiough and Wu (2009)), Su￿ (2009) highlights the relevance of cash ￿ow and debt
measures for credit agreements. With cash ￿ow decreases being associated with covenant
violations, CCE is only a conditional substitute for LOC. Hardin, High￿eld, Hill, and
2Because much is said about capital structure theories, namely trade-o￿, pecking-order and market-
timing theory, we forego the reproduction and refer to Feng, Ghosh, and Sirmans (2007), Hardin and Wu
(2010) or Harrison, Panasian, and Seiler (2011) for the real estate market or Hovakimian, Hovakimian,
and Tehranian (2004) or Flannery and Rangan (2006) for the general ￿nance literature.
3For interview based studies, see Lins, Servaes, and Tufano (2010) in 2005 or Campello, Graham, and
Harvey (2010) in 2008. For empirical studies based on the real estate market see Hardin, High￿eld,
Hill, and Kelly (2009) or Su￿ (2009) for broad market evidence.
5Kelly (2009) con￿rm a substitutive relationship between CCE and LOC. Moreover, the
authors state that REIT managers choose not to accumulate cash, preferring to ￿nance
externally, gaining from reduced agency con￿icts of monitoring and reduced costs of ￿-
nancing.
While empirical evidence suggests a negative relationship between LEV and CCE
(Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz, and Williamson (1999); Ozkan and Ozkan (2004); Hardin,
High￿eld, Hill, and Kelly (2009)), our perspective suggests a positive, but non-linear
relationship. This becomes clear when considering the insurance aspects of both instru-
ments: low leverage preserves debt capacity, i.e. the ability to borrow in the future, high
cash reserves hedge against the risk of underinvestment and cash ￿ow shortfalls, but
mainly against the latter. This view is supported by Lins, Servaes, and Tufano (2010),
who ￿nd no signi￿cant (contemporaneous) relationship, but refer to argument which we
have just stated. Denis and Sibilkov (2010) also favor the hedging argument of CCE
for underinvestment, but predict a negative correlation of LEV and CCE. Gamba and
Triantis (2008) investigate a ￿rm’s ￿nancial ￿exibility, driven by levels of borrowing and
lending. By controlling cash and debt, the resulting positive net debt implicates a higher
￿rm value, although with a decreasing marginal e￿ect with respect to the mixture of cash
and debt.4 Acharya, Almeida, and Campello (2007) also argue that CCE constitutes
negative debt. Their implications are dependent on varying degrees of hedging needs,
namely a lower risk of underinvestment implicating that ￿rms pay down their outstand-
ing debt.
Moreover, a negative relationship between LEV and LOC seems to be empirically
robust, as well as consistent with the calculus of ￿nancial ￿exibility. Riddiough and Wu
(2009) declare that REITs increased dividend payout in the 1990 to 2003 period, leaving
these speci￿c companies with lower cash reserves than non-REITs, whereas the use of
LOC is comparable. Therefore, interpreting a high LEV as the inability to borrow in the
4Hill, Kelly, and Hardin (2010) report a $1.34 increase ($0.30 decrease) of ￿rm value due to a $1 increase
of CCE (one standard deviation increase of unused LOC) based on empirical investigation of REITs.
6future (e.g. Gamba and Triantes 2008) ￿ and hence classi￿ed as the reciprocal of debt ca-
pacity ￿ LEV and LOC yield reverse dynamics. Second, LEV accounts for drawing LOC
and the change of other external sources of ￿nance. Third, since the dynamics between
LEV and CCE, as well as LOC, have not been comprehensively empirically investigated,
the stochastic properties of the variables of interest would allow at least the following
prediction. Assuming that CCE and LOC are not independent of each other, namely
negative, a reverse relationship of LEV applies to each of them. Assuming positive CCE-
LEV dynamics, the hypothesized sign of LEV and LOC follows technically.
Summarizing the arguments of Spotlight A, the liquidity sources have di￿erent tasks,
but are dependent on ￿rm characteristics, as well as the state of the economy. Moreover,
a preference for one or the other may depend on the original level.
2.3 Spotlight B: Leverage is ’just’ a Ratio
The second spotlight on leverage takes properties of this ratio into account. If equity
and debt increase by the same percentage, a leverage ratio will simply cancel out these
dynamics, but total (i.e. non-current) assets increase. The relative position of debt still
plays a signi￿cant role in terms of anticipative liquidity policy, but in order to di￿erenti-
ate between ￿nancial actions, debt and equity must be treated separately.
Today’s decisions are determined jointly, they are dependent on what happened in
the past and also in￿uence the (unknown) future. Therefore, the ￿rst imperative, when
dealing with ￿nancial ￿exibility is dynamic modeling. Gatchev, Pulvino, and Tarhan
(2010) distinguish between debt and equity, and do so between all the main aggregates
from the cash-￿ow statement ￿ one example of a more cash-￿ow-focused mentality since
the late-2000s ￿nancial crisis. The authors detect a much lower sensitivity of investment
to shocks to cash ￿ows, concluding that ￿nancing sensitivity with respect to cash ￿ows
is much more relevant than investment responses. Gatchev, Pulvino, and Tarhan (2010)
de￿ne an identity where one dollar cash in-￿ow corresponds exactly to one dollar cash
7out￿ow. Chen and Zhao (2007) also worked with an accounting identity in which assets
are de￿ned by last year’s assets plus the change in debt, equity and retained earnings.
The authors suggest that ￿rms levered below the median increase leverage by increas-
ing debt, but highly levered ￿rms increase equity while decreasing debt. Almeida and
Campello (2007) also investigate ￿nancing-investment sensitivities with respect to the
state of the market and ￿rm characteristics. They agree that cash-￿ow shocks a￿ect
primarily constrained ￿rms. However, the portion of tangible assets in particular, deter-
mines the procyclical aspect of debt capacity with respect to the business cycle.
In summary, the importance of distinguishing between the numerator and denomina-
tor of LEV is the focus of the second spotlight on LEV. In addition to research surrounding
LEV, CCE and LOC, the relevance of real assets (investment) and cash ￿ow is deter-
mined. DeAngelo and DeAngelo (2007) suggest ￿new testable hypothesis [...] for future
research [...] [is that] ￿rms’ long-run leverage targets are inversely related in cross-section
and time-series to the (investment distortion-reducing) value of ￿nancial ￿exibility.￿
2.4 Research Goal from a Bird’s Eye
In a perfect world, there is no need to hoard cash or hedge in any other way, because
￿rms have access to the capital market at any time without transactions costs, when
investment opportunities arrive. Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz, and Williamson (1999) de￿ne
a ￿rm as being short of liquid assets, if it has to sell assets or cut capital expenditures
or dividends. By contrast, this paper considers how, dependent on the state of the econ-
omy and ￿rm characteristics, investment funding is in￿uenced by the drivers of ￿nancial
￿exibility, namely debt capacity (reciprocal LEV), CCE and LOC. However, we adjust
the concept of assuming an optimum amount of ’￿nancial ￿exibility’. The marginal costs
of being short of money in periods when a ￿rm would actually need funding are a de-
creasing function with respect to instruments of ￿nancial ￿exibility. On the other hand,
foregoing borrowing power in terms of LEV (on balance, but not directly measurable in
terms of being ￿nancially constrained), the opportunity costs of CCE (on balance and
8fully measurable) and fees for the availability of LOC (o￿ balance and partly measurable
in terms of e￿ciency) act in a contrary manner, so as to antagonize these marginal costs.
Therefore, there has to be an optimum where the marginal costs of underinvestment and
￿nancial distress coincide with the costs associated with being ￿nancially ￿exible. Despite
the fact that CCE plays a minor role for real estate companies, this is an unconditional
source for hedging underinvestment, if outside investors are unwilling to provide funds.
Yet, cash hedges particularly e￿ectively in economic downturns, since a low-leverage ￿rm
would still be dependent on external capital. LOC agreements could be canceled in the
event of covenant breaks. However, of the three sources, CCE is associated most strongly
with costs of asymmetric information, because outsiders doubt the appropriate use by
managers, while debt has the advantage of monitoring (Hardin, High￿eld, Hill, and Kelly
(2009)).5
Figure 1: Concept of Financial Flexibility
Note: This ￿gure depicts the equilibrium between the costs of ￿nancial ￿exibil-
ity and (in-)direct costs associated with underinvestment and ￿nancial distress.
From this perspective, the objective function describes the ability to secure su￿cient
￿nancial resources and to raise su￿cient ￿nancial resources to implement pro￿table in-
vestments with respect to uncertainty and the e￿ciency constraint in terms of the direct
5For the relevance of information asymmetry for a ￿rm’s choice between CCE and LOC, see also An,
Hardin, and Wu (2010).
9and indirect costs of ￿nancial ￿exibility. We hypothesize that ￿nancial ￿exibility is a
broader, but more consistent concept in explaining the dynamics of ￿nancing activities,
compared to traditional capital structure theory.
3 Data
The SEC statements compiled by SNL Financial are the basis of our panel data set.
The initial sample contains 316 operating and acquired or defunct US Equity REITs and
REOCs traded on the NYSE, NYSE Amex Equities and NASDAQ from 1996 to 2010,
with 56% non-missing values. Company foundations and liquidations are responsible for
79% of the missing values, whereas 21% are due to unreported data. The broad an-
nouncements of cash ￿ow statements in SNL from 1996 onwards, as well as the dynamic
modeling, including lagged di￿erences, restrict the sample to the 1998-2010 period and
eliminate 36 ￿rms with less than three consecutive years. 6
Table (1) provides de￿nitions and computations of the variables and approximations
used in this study. All ￿nancial variables are truncated at the 5th and 95 th percentile.
LEV (LOC) is cut at the 95th percentile only, because 6% (9%) of the observations are
zero. The truncation is to a lesser extent intended to reduce the in￿uence of outliers,
rather than to focus the study on ￿rms with typical ￿nancial characteristics. Subse-
quently, the end-of-year ￿nancial data are de￿ated by the US Producer Price Index of
the US Bureau of Labor Statistics. Therefore, the ￿nal sample includes 140 Equity REITs
and REOCs corresponding to 558 ￿rm-year observations.
Research on cash balances suggests the need to scale variables by non-cash assets, in
order to forego mechanical relationships (see Su￿ (2009)), analogous to the arguments
associated with Spotlight B. However, since debt scaled by assets (leverage) would de-
crease after CCE scaled by non-cash assets has increased for mechanical reasons, we scale
6A further reason for starting in 1996 is the beginning of a consolidation phase, after a boom of the
REIT sector in the 1990s.
10Table 1: Variable Description
Variable Description De￿nition
Balance Sheet Aggregates
STD Short-term debt Debt payable within a business year
LTD Long-term debt Debt payable after a business year
EQU Common equity (shareholder equity)   (preferred equity)
DPROP Depreciable property PPE + accumulated depreciation
NFI Net of ￿nancing and investment cash ￿ow CCE   CF_Op
Instruments of Liquidity Management
CCE Cash & cash equivalents Cash or assets easily convertible into cash
LEV Market leverage (total debt) = (market value of assets)
LOC Lines of credit Aggregate lines of credit and other
revolving credit agreements available
CF_Op Operating CF Net cash provided by operating activities
Control Variables
S&P500 Standard & Poor’s 500 Index ln(S&P500 t = S&P500t 1)
MB Growth opportunities (market equity) = (book equity)
ROA Pro￿tability Return on assets
Size Size of a ￿rm ln(total assets)
Dummies
Rating Access to public debt 1 if ￿rm has investment-grade rating ...
Op_Risk Operating risk 1 if ￿rm has CF volatility above the median ...
Inv_Shock Investment shock 1 if %-change is above the 55 th percentile ...
FFO_Shock Shock on sustainable CF 1 if %-change is below the 45 th percentile ...
... and 0 otherwise
Note: The table describes the variables used in the dynamic model for the two spotlights
on leverage. Mean and standard deviations of the dependent variables in the multi-equation
framework are reported in the respective estimation reports for the full sample, as well as
for each subsample.
variables with the beginning of the period value of total assets, rather than divide the
variables by non-cash-and-debt assets.
3.1 (Balance Sheet) Items De￿ning the Identity
The variables STD for short-term debt, and LTD for long-term debt, describe the lia-
bilities of the company to a third party, whereas EQU for common equity, describes the
claims of the shareholders. DPROP for depreciable property is calculated as the sum
of property, plant and equipment (PPE) and accumulated depreciation. The di￿erences
between DPROP over time characterize the net expenditures of the company in PPE.
In line with Harrison, Panasian, and Seiler (2011), real estate investment, as the source
of collateral and asset tangibility, should increase the debt capacity of a ￿rm. However,
from our point of view, net property (real estate) investment foregoes the link of inter-
nal ￿nancing through depreciation. 7 Hence, approximating the change in ￿xed assets by
7Riddiough and Wu (2009) report that the 90% payout restriction transfers to 55%-70% pre-dividend
payout, whereas An et al. (2010) relate this to 85% of FFO. Both ￿gures highlight the relevance of
11DPROP does not dilute the actual stock of real estate. Apart from minor aggregates, the
sum of operating, investment and ￿nancing cash ￿ow is the change in CCE and completes
the identity, which is introduced in detail in the next section.
3.2 Instruments of Liquidity Management
The following sources are de￿ned as the instruments of liquidity management. Cash &
cash equivalents (CCE) describe the potential of the internal ￿nance source for future
projects and increase the ￿rm’s ￿nancial ￿exibility. By contrast, market leverage (LEV)
is the ratio of total debt to the market value of assets and lowers a ￿rm’s debt capacity.
While market LEV is used throughout the analysis, the results are also compared to
book LEV, which is total debt to year-beginning total assets. The available lines of
credit (LOC) are a revolving debt source extended by a bank. On the one hand, they
o￿er future ￿nancial ￿exibility for the ￿rm, but on the other hand, they are subject to
fees for the unused lines.
3.3 Traditional Capital Structure Determinants
The following determinants are typical control variables used in capital structure studies.
The general (stock) market cycles in￿uence the development of real estate ￿rms with
respect to systematic risks and opportunities. This impact is incurred through the con-
tinuous returns of the S&P500. The market-to-book ratio (MB), calculated by market
equity divided by book equity, characterizes the idiosyncratic growth opportunity. 8 The
pro￿tability of a ￿rm ￿ measured by return on assets (ROA) ￿ may also in￿uence the
capital structure, as it is easier to issue debt and equity for more pro￿table ￿rms. The
size of a ￿rm is captured by the natural logarithm of its total assets, assuming decreasing
marginal economies of scale. With respect to balance sheet aggregates, a mechanical size
e￿ect on DPROP, STD, LTD and EQU is mitigated, due to scaling by total assets.
depreciation for internal funding
8Traditionally, MB is approximated by the deviation of market and book value of assets, rather than
equity. In order to reduce the mechanical relationship to market leverage, the latter possibility is chosen.
123.4 Additional Dummies Approximating Firm Characteristics
The dummy Rating has a value of one, if the ￿rm has at least an investment grade long-
term issuer rating from S&P, Moody’s or Fitch. It approximates access to the public debt
market, due to relatively lower transaction costs and levels of asymmetric information.
The dummy Op_Risk equals one, if the volatility of operating CF exceeds the conditional
median of the twelve di￿erent property segments. It approximates the operational risk
confronting a real estate company.
The two remaining dummies are unique to our research. As derived in the literature
section, it is of interest to determine whether a ￿rm faces strong investment opportunities
or substantial CF shortfalls. Therefore, the Inv_Shock variable summarizes all observa-
tions with a percentage change of the market-to-book ratio above the 55 th percentile,
conditional on the property segments. The computation for the FFO_Shock is similar.
This determinant indicates observations with low percentage changes in funds from op-
erations (FFO), if the changes are below the conditional 45 th percentile. FFO is typically
calculated by adding real estate depreciation to the GAAP net income, excluding gains or
losses from sales of properties or debt restructuring, and is interpreted as the sustainable
cash ￿ow. Observations with low (more negative) percentage changes in their FFOs are
assumed to trigger higher leverage and lower equity.
3.5 Dealing with Cross-Industry Variation
It is common in real estate ￿nance to allow for varying intercepts for di￿erent property
segments. However, Ertugrul and Giambona (2011) show that the relative standing of
a ￿rm within its property focus segment (￿micro industry￿) is essential for determining
leverage. The rationale behind this approach is simply that it is not appropriate to
compare pro￿tability, leverage, or, as in this study, di￿erent forms of hedging tools of
e.g. an o￿ce with a residential property company. Table (2) contains the t-statistics of
Welch’s t-test for the sources of liquidity across property segments. The results of the
t-test, whether the segment means are equal to the sample mean, indicate that 10 of 21
13conditional means are signi￿cantly di￿erent to the overall sample mean.
Table 2: Cross-Industry Variance for Financial Liquidity Instruments
LEV CCE LOC
Property Focus N Mean t-stat N Mean t-stat N Mean t-stat
All 558 0.406 558 0.015 558 0.162
O￿ce 103 0.411 -0.5 103 0.012 2.261* 103 0.167 -0.597
Residential 103 0.424 -1.779 103 0.011 3.337** 103 0.167 -0.737
Retail 122 0.446 -3.445*** 122 0.013 1.295 122 0.164 -0.264
Industrial 40 0.407 -0.072 40 0.018 -0.87 40 0.162 -0.052
Hotel 58 0.374 1.931 58 0.022 -2.492* 58 0.146 1.448
Diversi￿ed 59 0.415 -0.549 59 0.018 -1.714 59 0.131 3.286**
Others 73 0.327 6.054*** 73 0.019 -1.584 73 0.182 -2.278*
Note: This table shows the t-statistics (t-stat) of Welch’s t-test. LEV refers to the market
leverage. CCE refers to cash & cash equivalents, LOC to lines of credit available, both scaled
by year-beginning total assets. ***, **, and * denote statistical signi￿cance at the 1%, 5%,
and 10% levels, respectively.
Therefore, we compare the results of the high and low subsamples. According to
the ￿rm characteristics of the respective twelve property segments, a ￿rm enters the
low (high) subsample, if it yields a value below (above) the 45 th (55th) percentile for a
given ￿rm characteristic. The characteristics are LEV, CCE, LOC, MB, ROA and Size.
Furthermore, subsamples are constructed for the boom years (1996-1999, 2003-2007 and
2009-2010), bust years (2000-2002 and 2008) and for the sample before the late-2000s
￿nancial crisis (before 2008). Moreover, the attributes of whether a ￿rm ’is rated as
investment grade’, ’has an above-median cash ￿ow volatility’ or ’experienced positive as
opposed to negative cash-￿ow changes’ are identi￿ed accordingly.
4 Model
The concept underlying this paper is basically that of combining the cash ￿ow statement
approach of Gatchev, Pulvino, and Tarhan (2010) with the balance-sheet view of Chen
and Zhao (2007).
More speci￿cally, the ideas that we adopt are a system of equations, estimated by
weighted least squares, where the weight is reciprocal to the number of observations per
year. By also following the advice of Petersen (2009), the methodological di￿erence, is
14that we decided to include year dummies in order to account for time e￿ects. 9 An even
more important di￿erence is that we do not need to de-￿ne our identity, but eliminate
48 ￿rm-year observations which do not satisfy the conditions in equations (1) and (2). 10
Cash Flow from Operationsi;t
+ Cash Flow from Financingi;t
+ Cash Flow from Investmenti;t
= Cash and Cash Equivalents (CCE)i;t
(1)
Through equation (1), we relate the operating cash ￿ow (CF_Op) to changes in bal-
ance sheet items by modeling
Operating CFi;t
! =   (Financing CFi;t + Investment CFi;t)   :::
  Depreciable Propertyi;t + STDi;t + LTDi;t + :::
+ Common Equityi;t + Resid(All)i;t + errori;t
(2)
9Gatchev, Pulvino, and Tarhan (2010) demeaned their variables by the year means, which is associated
with a manual adjustment of con￿dence intervals (especially in smaller samples like ours). Accordingly,
after demeaning our sample, the year dummies re-main jointly signi￿cant.
10Gatchev, Pulvino, and Tarhan (2010) did not capture the whole cash-￿ow statement and thus had to
de￿ne this identity in combination with a penalty function.
15where:
NFIi;t = Financing CFi;t + Investment CFi;t
Resid(All)i;t = Resid(Assets)i;t + Resid(Liab:&Equi:)i;t
Resid(Assets)i;t = Total Assetsi;t   Depreciable Propertyi;t   :::
  (CCE)i;t
Resid(Liab:&Equi:)i;t = (Liabilitiesi;t   Total Debti;t) + :::
+ Total Mezzaninei;t + Preferred Equityi;t
errori;t =   Total Assetsi;t + STDi;t + LTDi;t + :::
+ Common Equityi;t + Resid(Liab:&Equi:)i;t
The ￿rst two summands of equation (2) expresses the change in total assets, while
the second row expresses the change in equity plus liabilities of the variables in our focus.
The change in Resid(All) subsumes the remaining aggregates of the balance sheet. 11




Therefore, the basic model accounting for Spotlight B can be written as
11The sum of ￿nancing and investment cash ￿ow was originally allocated to the change in Resid(All),
which should only play a minor role for the system dynamics. However, the dynamics of this variable
were too often signi￿cant, due to the substantial relevance of these two cash ￿ows.
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or in compact form
Y =    L:Y +   CF_Op +   C + 	  D + i;t
’Y’ represents all the right hand side variables of equation (2), which are also imple-
mented as lagged regressors. 12 Operating cash ￿ows ’CF_Op’, as well as the ￿rm char-
acteristics ’C’, namely S&P500, MB, ROA and Size are proposed as contemporaneous
independent variables. The dummies ’D’ (Rating, Op-Risk, Inv_Shock and FFO_Shock)
complete equation (3).13 By construction, it follows that all coe￿cients per row add up
to zero, but the operating CF’s impact on ’Y’ sum to one.
12Besides Gatchev, Pulvino, and Tarhan (2010), the funding cycle of Brown and Riddiough (2003) in
conjunction with Riddiough and Wu (2009) would also suggest this dynamic framework.
13We also considered dummies like ’incorporated in Delaware or Maryland’, ’￿rm is a REIT’, ’￿rm age’
etc., that are partially implemented in real estate corporate ￿nance research. However, due to the
limited useful and signi￿cant insights thus obtained, we disregard these characteristics.
17Table 3: Basic Model (according to equation (3))
(1)+(2)+(3)+:::
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) +(4) (5) (6)
Resid(All) STD LTD EQU DPROP NFI Balance Sheet
Identity
L.Resid(All) 0.133 -0.299* -0.720* -0.527** -0.965** -0.447*** 0.0000033
(0.62) (-1.84) (-1.90) (-2.50) (-2.08) (-5.53)
L.STD 0.168 -0.660*** -0.231 -0.409* -0.686 -0.446*** 0.0000077
(0.82) (-3.65) (-0.58) (-1.96) (-1.42) (-5.37)
L.LTD 0.181 -0.260 -0.604 -0.447** -0.681 -0.449*** 0.0000061
(0.90) (-1.54) (-1.60) (-2.26) (-1.48) (-5.62)
L.EQU 0.179 -0.234 -0.576 -0.460** -0.646 -0.445*** 0.0000014
(0.91) (-1.39) (-1.57) (-2.40) (-1.50) (-5.60)
L.DPROP -0.166 0.288* 0.784** 0.558*** 1.009** 0.456*** -0.0000057
(-0.80) (1.68) (2.01) (2.74) (2.14) (5.52)
L.NFI -0.217 0.052 0.677** 0.518*** 0.906** 0.124** -0.0000091
(-1.49) (0.38) (2.01) (3.26) (2.42) (2.05)
CF_Op 0.169 -0.006 1.192*** 0.453** 1.760*** -0.952*** 0.9999973
(1.03) (-0.05) (3.48) (2.48) (4.08) (-15.62)
S&P500 0.021 -0.005 0.068* 0.055*** 0.123*** 0.016** -0.0000002
(1.30) (-0.26) (1.75) (3.22) (4.32) (1.98)
MB -0.005** -0.002 0.019*** -0.008*** 0.004 0.001 0.0000001
(-2.11) (-0.72) (3.61) (-2.69) (0.52) (0.84)
ROA -0.003* -0.000 -0.007*** 0.006*** -0.005** 0.001** 0.0000000
(-1.98) (-0.54) (-3.86) (4.36) (-2.17) (1.99)
Size -0.001 -0.001 -0.003 -0.002 -0.008 0.000 0.0000000
(-0.58) (-0.87) (-0.86) (-0.73) (-1.53) (0.89)
Rating -0.003 -0.005 0.014 0.002 0.009 -0.001 0.0000000
(-0.50) (-1.32) (1.60) (0.43) (0.92) (-0.83)
Op_Risk -0.003 0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.003 -0.000 0.0000000
(-0.61) (0.37) (-0.12) (-0.27) (-0.33) (-0.51)
Inv_Shock 0.011*** -0.004 -0.012 -0.016*** -0.021** -0.001 0.0000002
(2.68) (-1.19) (-1.65) (-4.21) (-2.38) (-0.65)
FFO_Shock -0.001 0.003 -0.005 -0.013** -0.016* -0.000 -0.0000001
(-0.13) (0.65) (-0.65) (-2.57) (-1.69) (-0.00)
N 558 558 558 558 558 558
adj. R-sq 0.024 0.160 0.229 0.209 0.225 0.676
N_clust 140 140 140 140 140 140
Mean(y) 0.021 0.008 0.049 0.030 0.105 -0.062
St.Dev(y) 0.048 0.048 0.094 0.052 0.108 0.026
Note: This table shows results based on equation (3). STD refers to short-term debt, LTD to long-term debt,
EQU to common equity, DPROP to depreciable property, NFI to the net of the ￿nancing and investment
cash ￿ow, Resid(All) subsumes all remaining balance sheet items as de￿ned in equation (2), all measured
in ￿rst di￿erences and scaled by year-beginning total assets. CF_Op refers to operating cash ￿ow scaled
by year-beginning total assets. S&P500 refers to the continuous return of the S&P500 index, MB to the
ratio of market value over book value of equity, ROA to return on assets, Size to the ln of total assets. The
dummy Rating is equal to one, if a ￿rm has an investment grade rating, Op_Risk is equal to one, if a ￿rm’s
cash ￿ows are above the median in the respective property segment, Inv_Shock is equal to one, if a ￿rm’s
percentage change in MB is above the 55 th percentile in the respective property segment, FFO_Shock is
equal to one, if a ￿rm’s percentage change of FFO is below the 45 th percentile in the respective property
segment, and zero otherwise. Year dummies are not reported. N denotes ￿rm-year observations of each
equation, N_cluster denotes the number of observed ￿rms, Mean(y) and St.Dev.(y) represent mean and
standard deviation of the dependent variable. The last column illustrates the accounting identity de￿ned in
equation (2). T-stats are in parenthesis, ***, **, and * denote statistical signi￿cance at the 1%, 5%, and
10% levels, respectively.
This is basically the modeling aspect of emphasizing leverage. Liquidity management
is essential in modeling ￿nancing decisions. Therefore, the other spotlight highlights the
debt ratio from interactions with competing sources of ￿nancial ￿exibility, namely CCE
and LOC. Therefore, the full model adds LEV, CCE and LOC to equation (3). The
quadratic terms of these three sources are also implemented, since no previous study has
18so far explored potential non-linear relationships between LEV, CCE and LOC. In the
manner, interactions between the three instruments of ￿nancial ￿exibility are dependent
on the original level, which is the main reason for the quadratic terms (i.e. Su￿ 2007, for
LOC and CCE or Gamba and Triantis (2008), for cash and debt).
Y =    L:Y +   CF_Op +   C + 	  D +   S + 
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Finally, we challenge equation (4) with respect to three di￿erent ’sets’ of conditions.
The ￿rst simply splits our sample in economic up- and downturns, as well as the sub-
sample before the recent late 2000s ￿nancial crisis. Second, rather than interpreting ￿rm
characteristics typically used in capital structure research (MB, ROA and Size), we com-
pare subsamples with low and high levels for these variables of interest. The same is
done for the sources of ￿nancial ￿exibility, in order to take a further look at how relation-
ships are dependent on the original level (rankings are de￿ned according to the respective
property focus, see data section). In addition, subsamples are compared with respect to
Rating, Op_Risk and the change in CF_Op.
Y (Xjsubsample) =    L:Y +   CF_Op +   C + 	  D +   S + 
  S
2 + i;t (5)
195 Results
This section is also separated in Spotlight A and Spotlight B and all conditional subsam-
ples are considered. However, only full sample and conditional estimations with respect
to time and MB, ROA and Size, as well as LEV, CCE and LOC are reported. 14
5.1 Spotlight A
In the literature section, it was pointed out that the negative LOC-CCE interactions seem
to be empirically robust. Across the 22 subsamples, we ￿nd a robust negative (non-linear)
relationship for CCE on LOC, but only six subsamples reveal reverse causality.
The literature section did not provide a robust prediction of how LEV ￿ts into the
dynamics of this discussion. Initially, LEV yields contrary interactions with LOC. If sig-
ni￿cant, the ’negative’ causality runs from LEV to LOC and only for the squared terms
(14/22 subsamples). Furthermore, we ￿nd four negative (four positive) impacts of LOC
on LEV, most obviously for the subsamples low (high) CCE and low (high) LOC ￿rms.
This could simply be due to the chronology of the ￿funding cycle￿ of Riddiough and Wu
(2009). If LEV increases due to the use of LOC, then a negative relationship follows
technically. Alternatively, if debt decreases due to the repayment of outstanding debt,
the next funding cycle is established by blowing up LOC. On the other hand, if LOC
increases, it is not clear when the ￿rm draws these lines. Moreover, the LOC-LEV inter-
actions are exclusively the case for the squared terms (except for small ￿rms).
Second, LEV-CCE interactions are much weaker. LEV positively drives CCE in 6/22
subsamples, which is also restricted to the squared terms. In contrast, CCE negatively
impacts on LEV in 3/22 sub-samples. This is the case for the high LOC and high CCE
￿rms, as well as for ￿rms with high CF volatility. A reason for this might be that on
the one hand, having a reasonable amount of one of these two sources, the marginal
value of lowering debt as the third source increases. On the other hand, high CCE or
14All estimations are, as always, available on request.
20LOC subsamples imply that these ￿rms are able to a￿ord a drop in ￿nancial ￿exibility
by lowering CCE, accompanied by an increase in debt. In the case of ￿rms with highly
volatile cash ￿ows, we argue that CCE will be used before debt increases, in the event of
a CF shortfall. Accordingly, both instruments will be ’reloaded’ (more CCE, less debt)
after positive movements from the CF mean.
In short, in four of the six subsamples, in which LEV is signi￿cant with respect to
CCE, LEV is also signi￿cant for LOC. Alternatively, the relationship of LEV on CCE
(LOC) is always positive (negative). If signi￿cant, CCE on LEV is always negative and
in these subsamples, LOC on LEV is always positively signi￿cant. Hence, the above
stochastic argument of a reverse relationship of CCE and LOC on LEV and vice versa
holds for each of the 22 subsamples. This can be observed directly in the sub-samples
high CCE, high LOC and high Op_Risk.
Before discussing the remaining variables, four ￿ndings are highlighted. First, the ex-
pected strong, empirical, negative relationship of LOC and CCE is reduced to a causality
from CCE to LOC. Second, causality also seems to be stronger for LEV on LOC and
for LEV on CCE, compared to the reverse causalities. Third, the ￿nancial ￿exibility
perspective provides the basis for a complementary relationship of CCE and LEV and a
substitutive one of CCE and LOC. Finally, the dependence on the original level of one or
the other source is strongly suggested by a dominance of signi￿cant squared terms. Also,
the change in signs of signi￿cant relationships in the case of LOC on LEV, dependent on
low/high CCE or LOC ￿rms, clearly demonstrate the importance of the original level.
It was expected that CF would positively a￿ect LOC (Su￿ (2009)), whereas a CF-CCE
relationship was expected for constraint subsamples. However, CF plays only a minor role
within this framework. The results suggest only one positive estimate for LEV (during
economic downturns), one negative estimate for CCE (low MB ￿rms) and two positive
estimates for LOC (high Size and low Op_Risk ￿rms). S&P500 a￿ects LEV negatively,
21while it a￿ects CCE positively; LOC is negatively a￿ected by the S&P500 continuous
returns for high ROA, low LEV and high LOC ￿rms. Di￿erences in the market and
book value of equity (MB) are negatively associated with LEV. However, MB in￿uences
LOC positively (10/22 subsamples), fully consistent with ￿nancial ￿exibility, where ￿rms
with growth opportunities prepare to counter underinvestment due to potential liquidity
gaps. As expected, CCE plays a subordinate role as a hedging tool, but is, as with LOC,
positively driven by MB in ￿ve subsamples. In accordance with the argument given for
LEV-CCE interactions, two of the ￿ve subsamples are low LEV and high LOC ￿rms,
hence, the marginal value of accumulating CCE as the third source increases in response
to a MB increase.
Accordingly, ROA and Size a￿ect LEV negatively. However, the latter relationship
is much weaker. Moreover, both CCE and LOC are in￿uenced marginally by (positive)
ROA dynamics. In contrast, a negative Size e￿ect applies to both liquidity instruments,
implying that ￿rm size substitutes for ￿nancial ￿exibility to some extent. This is even
more the case for LOC (16/22 subsamples). Accordingly, high LEV, low CCE and low
LOC ￿rms yield a negative size e￿ect for LOC, while their counterparts do not reveal
such e￿ects with any signi￿cance. Low LEV ￿rms even yield a positive relationship of
Size on CCE.15 This exception is illustrated by the subsample Size itself, in which large
￿rms yield a negative relationship of Size to LOC, whereas small ￿rms yield a positively
signi￿cant relationship.
The impact of the set of dummies is less evident. Rated ￿rms in general have lower
levels of CCE, moreover they have less debt. Firms with higher Op_Risk seem to have
higher levels of borrowing and lending in order to smooth out the variance. 16 Shocks pri-
15Since growth opportunities approximate for a need for ￿nancial ￿exibility, we observe a positive estimate
of Size on CCE for high MB ￿rms, whereas the counterpart yields a negative one.
16Despite little signi￿cant estimates, the size subsample again delivered ambiguous results. Small ￿rms
with an operating risk hold less LOC, but their counterparts just do the reverse. This is contrary to
the negative Size e￿ect for liquidity instrument stated above. A reason for this might be that small
￿rms with volatile cash ￿ows receive less LOC in general, while big ￿rms additionally hedge against
CF shortfalls contrary to big ￿rms without a high operating risk.
22marily a￿ect LEV, investment shocks negatively (19/22 subsamples), FFO shocks posi-
tively (8/22 subsamples).17 There is some additional discussion with respect to the shock
dummies in the section on the mechanical aspects of leverage.
5.2 Spotlight B
The interpretation of Spotlight B is reduced to the discussion of LTD, EQU, DPROP
and LEV.18
First of all, the motivating aspects described above are addressed by investigating
how often there is an impact on LTD or EQU, but LEV is una￿ected and vice versa.
For this reason, we employ two approaches. On the one hand, we follow the suggestion
of Gatchev, Pulvino, and Tarhan (2010) by interpreting the number of signi￿cant esti-
mators in rows of matrix   of equation (5) as impulses of the independent variable, and
signi￿cances in columns as responses (recall table (4)). Focusing on responses, we ￿nd 18
(27) signi￿cant o￿-diagonal estimators for LTD (EQU), but only 22 for LEV. 19 We addi-
tionally pose the simple question of how often LTD and/or EQU are a￿ected by capital
structure variables, but LEV remains unchanged. Across the 22 subsample regressions,
it is primarily MB that a￿ects LTD and/or EQU 19 times, while LEV remains unchanged.
With respect to Size, we rarely ￿nd signi￿cant e￿ects, since we scaled by the year-
beginning total as-sets. As stated above, a negative relationship of Size is evidently the
case for LEV. MB positively (negatively) impacts LTD (EQU) and hence yields a signi￿-
17One exception is that Inv_Shock shows a positive sign to LEV before the late-2000s ￿nancial crisis.
18However, worth mentioning is the fact that the sum of ￿nancing and investment CF shows the most
considerable signi￿cances in our system. Hence, ￿ndings of Gatchev, Pulvino, and Tarhan (2010) that
these two ’activities’ would balance each other so that ￿nancing-investment sensitivities are mitigated
cannot be stated for the real estate market. Moreover, aspects of debt maturity as suggested by
Giambona, Harding, and Sirmans (2008) or Barclay, Marx, and Smith (2003) are simply modeled,
though not reported, by distinguishing between short and long term debt.
19Assuming persistence in accounting variables, we ignore signi￿cances of lagged dependent variables.
When we include lagged dependent variable, it is leverage, of course, which shows the highest persis-
tence, since it is not measured in ￿rst di￿erences (LTD 19, EQU 29, and LEV 42). Dependent variables
with more responses are also said to be ￿shock absorbers￿ (Gatchev, Pulvino, and Tarhan (2010)).
23cantly negative sign to LEV, moreover, rarely it a￿ects DPROP positively. In accordance
with the arguments relating to the mechanical aspects, a negative MB-LEV relationship
may be attributed to market valuation, which is in the numerator of MB, but in the
denominator of LEV. Analogously, this is assumed to be valid for EQU.
Finally, ROA positively (negatively) drives EQU (LTD and LEV) ￿ which was ex-
pected. However, a negative impact of ’pro￿tability’ on DPROP can again be attributed
either to mechanics (median depreciable property accounts for 96% of total assets, which
is the denominator of ROA) or is a further illustration of cash ￿ows being a superior
measure of a company’s soundness.
CF strictly shows positive impacts on LTD, EQU and DPROP and does not a￿ect
LEV, apart from the ’bust-subsample’. The most impressive instance is the very high
magnitude of estimates of CF for these three variables. While a $1 increase in operating
cash ￿ow robustly leads EQU to increase within a range of $0.35 to $0.66, estimators
of LTD are between $0.27 (low Size) and a much higher $1.37 (low Op_Risk). DPROP
is a￿ected between $1.01 (low LEV) to $2.80 (during Bust) by a $1.00 increase of CF.
These results suggest that ￿rms use the improvement in cash-￿ow-based credit-quality
ratios due to cash-￿ow increases and acquire more debt. Taking the full sample estima-
tion as a benchmark, for each subsample, it can be stated that the higher the CF-LTD
sensitivity the higher the CF-DPROP sensitivity.
In order to understand this, recall the identity of equation (3). Assume also that
Resid(All) and STD play a minor role, and further assume that a $1 change in operating
CF transfers to a $1 change in the sum of ￿nancing and investment CF whereas EQU is
very robustly a￿ected by about $0.52 (whole sample). A strong connection between LTD
and DPROP caused by operating CF then follows logical-ly.
Accordingly, S&P500 also positively in￿uences all variables considered, but positive
24Figure 2: ￿Liaison￿ of Debt and Investment via Cash Flows
Note: This ￿gure plots the marginal impacts of operating cash ￿ows (CF_Op)
to changes in long-term debt (LTD) and changes in common equity (EQU)
against the marginal impacts of CF_Op to changes in depreciable property
(DPROP).
market returns imply a lower LEV. The dummies Rating and Op_Risk rarely yield signi￿-
cant estimates. Across all estimations, INV_Shock and FFO_Shock yield a negative sign
for LTD, EQU and DPROP very robustly. However, while INV_Shock results in a lower
LEV, a FFO_Shock is compensated for by a higher LEV. This con￿rms the debt capacity
argument of future investment opportunities, by investment shocks robustly resulting in
a lower leverage. Therefore, if both variables are signi￿cant in the same equation, the
magnitudes of the estimates are fairly equal. This also highlights the need to identify
drivers of ￿nancial decisions, since an investment shock seems to a￿ect balance sheet
changes similarly to an FFO shock, but the inference for LEV yields reverse dynamics.
5.3 Book Leverage
While MB yields a negative relationship to market LEV, it turns into a positively signif-
icant one for book LEV. Since it was argued that the negative correlation results from
a mechanical relationship, one would rely on book LEV. However, consider two identi-
cally characterized ￿rms with di￿erent market valuations. The higher valued ￿rm would
certainly have better access to ￿nancing sources. Yet, would a ￿rm that is not other-
wise constrained be interested in this? The calculus of ￿nancial ￿exibility would refute
such behavior. Indeed, we ￿nd no signi￿cant results for most of the ’good’ subsamples
(high LOC, high ROA, high Size, rated ￿rms and low Op_Risk). Most surprisingly, the
Inv_Shock dummy does not change its sign, even though it is less often signi￿cant (9 for
25book versus 19 for market LEV). In line with the original motivation for this approxi-
mation, it is signi￿cantly negative, especially for ￿nancially in￿exible ￿rms. On the one
hand, one might see this as a further indication of the interactions of the three sources
suggested in this paper being valid. On the other hand, it is evident that especially ￿rms
that are ￿nancially constrained and/or are confronted with potential underinvestment
preserve debt capacity.
A further important di￿erence is that book leverage is very sensitive to CF. Speci￿-
cally, a $1.00 increase in CF translates into about the same increase in debt. ROA remains
robustly negative and Size remains understated. 20 FFO_Shock is only signi￿cant twice,
suggesting that the bulk of variance in substantial FFO declines is priced by the capital
market. Moreover, general causalities stated for market LEV do not change, despite a
lesser appearance of linear and squared terms being signi￿cant.
With respect to Spotlight B, the approach of Gatchev, Pulvino, and Tarhan (2010),
we ￿nd the opposite. That is, we obtain 12 (23) o￿-diagonal elements for LTD (EQU)
of   in equation (3) but 54 for LEV. There is even more evidence of LEV eliminating
information, since we count 5/2/3 signi￿cant estimates of MB/ROA/Size for LTD and/or
EQU, whereas LEV remains unchanged across the 22 subsamples.
6 Conclusion
This paper emphasizes the importance of ￿nancial ￿exibility as the critical missing link for
an empirically viable capital structure study. Financial ￿exibility allows ￿rms to access
and restructure their ￿nancing activities at a low cost. Furthermore, it prevents ￿rms
from ￿nancial distress during economic downturns and allows for investments in value-
raising projects when they arise. We decided to investigate the capital structure of US
Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs) and Real Estate Operating Companies (REOCs)
by two approaches, spotlights A and B. In our investigation, ￿nancial ￿exibility is de￿ned
20In this sense, results based on book leverage suggest the pecking-order theory to be valid.
26in the sense of anticipating liquidity management instruments of leverage (LEV), cash &
cash equivalents (CCE) and lines of credit (LOC). At the beginning of this paper, the
position of leverage as one of the sources of ￿nancial ￿exibility (Spotlight A), as well as
technical attributes of this ratio (Spotlight B) were outlined.
This study can be seen as a bridge between emphasizing the characteristics of leverage
in the function of a ratio on the one hand, and classifying leverage as a driver of liquidity
management on the other hand. One of our ￿ndings is that leverage (LEV) drives cash
& cash equivalents (CCE) positively, but drives lines of credit (LOC) negatively. While
the latter result, as well as the substitutive relationship of cash & cash equivalents and
lines of credit are backed by the existing literature, the positive LEV-CCE relationship
is contrary to previous studies. This underlines the importance of credit lines for ￿rms’
liquidity management. The positive in￿uence of leverage on cash & cash equivalents can
be explained by ￿rms’ strategy to accumulate cash in order to fund investments when
pro￿table opportunities arise. In addition, our interaction results of LEV, CCE and LOC
are consistent with the typical funding cycle suggested by Riddiough and Wu (2009). The
typical funding cycle can be separated into the following steps. Anticipating investment
opportunities, a ￿rm arranges lines of credit with its bank. Subsequently, it begins to work
with its acquisition and after it reaches stable in￿ows, equity or long-term debt securities
are issued. Hence, the earnings are used to pay down lines of credit and recreate a
new funding cycle. This development can be found in our results. The investment
shock dummy ￿ unique to our research an measuring if a ￿rm faces strong investment
opportunities ￿ yields signi￿cant negative results with respect to the observation of ￿rms
lowering leverage, i.e. preserving debt capacity after investment shocks. In contrast, FFO
shocks ￿ measuring if a ￿rm exhibits little change in funds from operations (FFO) ￿
a￿ect balance sheet aggregates very similarly to investment shocks, but generally result
in leverage increases. This highlights the need to identify drivers of ￿nancial decisions,
since an investment shock seems to a￿ect balance sheet changes similarly to an FFO
shock, but the inference for leverage yields reverse dynamics.
Furthermore, our results derive the following major implications for managers. So far,
27real estate companies have almost abandoned cash as a hedging instrument. High cash
reserves would hedge against the risk of underinvestment and cash ￿ow shortfalls, but
mainly against the latter. However, our results show that this hedging capacity is rarely
used. In addition, decision makers tend to overdo investments after a cash ￿ow increase.
This can be noticed during economic downturns, before the late-2000s ￿nancial crisis,
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